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When shareholders have the controlling power, the companies may conduct 
earning management on behalf of controlling shareholders. The reform of shareholder 
structure provides an opportunity for controlling shareholders to manage their 
earnings. When the restricted shares liberalize, the benefit of controlling shareholders 
is connected with company’s stock price, which motivates shareholders to manipulate 
the earning in a positive way to realize the benefit in restricted shares liberalization. 
When the earning management is guided by the benefit of controlling shareholders, 
some ownership characteristics, such as ownership property, shareholding ratio, 
separating extent of ownership and controlling right, might influent earning 
management. On the other hand, when this happens, whether analysts, which play an 
important part in information transfer, can recognize and announce this 
shareholder-leading earning management? 
To study the above problems, we use data from listed companies from Shanghai 
and Shenzhen stock exchange which have the available controlling shareholders’ 
lockup data till the end of 2012. After empirical analysis based on lots of finished 
researchers, the results are as follows: 1、in order to maximize lockup interest, the 
controlling shareholders increased the earnings of quarterly financial reports 
purposely, through both accrued and real earnings management. 2、because of the 
special restriction of state-owned shareholders, the larger shareholding ratio is, the 
smaller degree of earning management is conducted in the process of liberalization of 
restricted shares. 3、shareholding ratio of controlling shareholders and separation of 
two rights is connected with accrued earning management positively, but show no 
connection with real earning management. 4、 analysts do not reflect earning 
management in their earning forecasts. Accrued earning management influents the 
accuracy of analyst forecast in shorter time than real earning management. 5、analysts 
forecast the earning of state-owned companies in a more pessimistically way. 
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remarkable influence in the accuracy of analyst earning forecast. 6、star analysts 
behave the same as non-star analysts in the forecast of earning management in the 
process of restricted shares liberalize, and analysts connected with brokers predict no 
more positively than independent analysts. 
    The main contribution of this paper: 1、the paper measures earning management 
in both accrued and real way, what is more, adding an aggregative indicator which 
reflects the two earning management method. 2、the paper studies the influence of 
ownership characteristics on earning management in the liberalization of restricted 
shares, thereby proclaim the controlling shareholders as the leader of earning 
management. 3、this study enriches the area in the ability of analysts to see through 
company earning management behaviors. 
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国内外许多研究均证实了控股股东主导下盈余管理行为的存在（La Porta et 
al.，1998，1999；雷光勇、张引、金鑫，2010；王化成、佟岩，2006）。而我国
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